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Abstract
We experimentally explore the effects of time pressure on decision making. Un-
der different time allowance conditions, subjects are presented with a queueing
situation and asked to join one of two queues that differ in length, server speed,
and entry fee. The results can be grouped under two main categories. The first
one concerns the factors driving customers’ decisions in a queueing system. Only
∗Corresponding Author
a proportion of subjects behave rationally and use the relevant information effi-
ciently. The rest of the subjects seem to adopt a rule of thumb that ignores the
information on server speed and follows the shorter queue. The second category
is related to the effects of time pressure on decision performance. A significant
proportion of the population is not affected by time limitations and shows a con-
sistent behavior throughout the treatments. On the other hand, the majority of
subjects’ performance is impaired by time limitations. More importantly, this
impairment is not due to the stringency of the limitation but mainly due to the
fact that being exposed to a time limitation, even to a loose one, brings along
stress and panic, and causes subjects to use time inefficiently. (JEL Classifica-
tions: C91, L00, C33, C35).
Keywords: Time pressure, queues with entry fee, join the shortest queue, experi-
mentation, decision times.
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I INTRODUCTION
In today’s fast paced world, many economic situations require quick and efficient judg-
ment, and decisions to be made in a minimal amount of time. Traders on financial
markets, for example, feel the time pressure severely since their reaction velocity to
new information is of great importance. Some other actors who are exposed to time
pressure are negotiators, last-minute bidders, managers and even customers in a retail
store since they ought to rapidly decide to which cashier counter queue to join in order
to avoid negative externalities from potential new comers.
In a situation where decision makers have less time than needed (or perceived as
needed), it is very likely that they feel the stress of coping with this limitation, and this,
in turn, may affect the performance. Furthermore, reactions to the stress caused by
time pressure may be diverse among individuals. Some may perform worse than they
would under no time pressure, while others may do better thanks to the stimulation
induced by this stress. The primary goal of this paper is to experimentally explore
the effects of time pressure on decision performance and investigate whether there is
heterogeneity in coping with time pressure.
In our experimental setting, we consider a queueing situation. Queues are formed,
and customers have to wait, whenever the capacity of a service provider fails to meet the
instantaneous demand. There are many instances in everyday life when one encounters
queues, for example, when buying museum or concert tickets, conducting a transaction
in a bank, calling a hotline, entering in a popular restaurant or club, etc.
Waiting in a queue is irritating, frustrating and hence, costly. Therefore, a customer
may decide to balk at the prospect of waiting or to abandon the queue after joining
and waiting for a while. Moreover, customers may even be willing to pay extra in order
to decrease or eliminate waiting times. Visitors of a Six Flags amusement park, for
example, can buy one of three types of pass (Regular, Gold and Platinum), in order to
eliminate physical wait in queues and reduce the actual waiting time. A driver without
any passenger can pay a fee and use high occupancy vehicle (HOV) lanes that are
originally designed for carpools of two or more.
What determines customer behavior is the comparison between the expected benefit
of getting the service and the expected cost of waiting. Under the assumption of
full rationality, this comparison is made by extracting information about the length,
velocity and the entry fee of a queue. However, it is questionable whether people
behave rationally and use the information they could extract when making a queueing
decision. The secondary goal of the present study ought to shed light on this issue by
analyzing the characteristics of queues to which people pay attention when making such
a decision. More specifically, we aim at answering the question of whether customers
accurately calculate the costs and benefits of joining a queue and make their decision
accordingly. If this is not the case, what is the behavioral pattern followed? Which
aspects of queues play important roles and affect decisions?
Our choice of the experimental setting, a queueing situation, makes it easier for
subjects to understand the experiment since it is a familiar set up they encounter
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many times in daily life. Furthermore, the queueing decision task requires no strategic
thinking. It is a binary choice where one alternative is objectively better than the
other. However, it requires cognitive abilities in order to correctly evaluate the two
given alternatives. The non-strategic feature of the queueing task sets the stage for
analyzing the impact of time pressure on the basics of a decision making process.
More importantly, understanding how customers behave in a queueing system helps
to determine how to operate a system in the most efficient way. According to Hillier
and Lieberman (2001), 37 billion hours per year are spent waiting in queues in the US,
which would amount to 20 million person-years of useful work per year, if it were spent
productively. This emphasizes the critical importance of designing queueing systems
based on customers’ behavior from a social welfare perspective.
In this article, we experimentally study and analyze customers’ behavior within a
simplistic queueing system. In a computerized laboratory setting, we ask subjects to
choose between two given queues, each of which is connected to a different server. The
servers provide the same service but they differ in entry fee,1 speed and length of the
queue connected. There are 40 such tasks and to examine the impact of time pressure on
customers’ choice each task is repeated three times under different treatment conditions
of time allowance: 5 seconds (5 sec), 10 seconds (10 sec) and no time limitation (NTL).
We analyze the data by means of a finite mixture model. The mixture approach
enables us to identify whether there are subjects in our sample who use all the provided
information efficiently, that is, base their decisions mainly on the profits they would
gain joining each queue, and if there are subjects who adhere, instead, to alternative
decision criteria.
As far as the results are concerned, our experimental analysis suggests that only
a proportion of the population makes choices exploiting information at best and acts
as a profit maximizers. The size of this group decreases as time limitation becomes
stringent. This amounts to say that time pressure increasingly impairs decision perfor-
mance. The remainder of the population appears to consider only part of the provided
information when making their decisions concerning the queue to join. These subjects
who ponder information in a less-than-efficient way are referred to as na¨ıve. What is
interesting here is that even though it is explicitly given, na¨ıve types seem to ignore the
average waiting times, and tend to join the shorter queue. The existence of this type
of behavior is also supported by the field experiment conducted by Lu et al. (2013) at
a grocery store deli counter.
From the analysis of the actual decision times, we discover that the decision time
significantly changes across treatments, and in particular it increases as time limitation
is relaxed. Moreover, a comparative analysis between average decision times of profit
maximizers and na¨ıve subjects shows that the former takes longer time than the latter
in any treatment. This result shows that profit maximizers use a decision criteria that
is cognitively more demanding than that used by na¨ıve subjects. Another interesting
result we obtain is that, when we introduce time limitation, decision performance
1The amount one has to pay in order to join the queue of a server.
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worsens significantly even if the given time is more than what is used under no time
limitation treatment. This observation implies that some subjects feel stressed due to
the presence of time limitation even if it is a very loose one. It is the existence of
limitation but not the insufficiency of time allowance that harms the performance of
these subjects.
Our results mirror somewhat those obtained by Rubinstein (2007) in game sit-
uations. The author invites the audience in some of his lectures to participate in
web-based experiments (e.g., beauty contest, ultimatum game, centipede game, and so
on), recording their response time. From the collected data, he infers that the choices
which need some cognitive reasoning require more time than those made instinctively.
However, the author admits some potential criticism to his approach, and in particu-
lar he points out the effect of individual heterogeneity. The present study overcomes
this by collecting several observations per subject and by means of a panel estimation
approach which enable us to control for individual-specific effects.
Another study related to ours is ?. It examines decision times in the context of
an experimental investigation of multiple prior models of behaviour under ambiguity,
distinguishing among four different types of decision maker. The analysis reveals that
the easier the preference functional subjects seem to apply the shorter the time they
take to make a decision between ambiguous lotteries.
The characterization of customer behavior in a queueing system analyzed in this
article provides useful inputs and suggestions for researchers as well as practitioners.
The fact that time pressure affects individuals diversely raises the question of whether
it is possible to design a mechanism that screens and discriminates customers. The
effects of this type of discrimination on the profit of a principle and on welfare could be
further investigated. Moreover, the findings we obtain in this article potentially pave
the way for further research on queueing behavior under more complicated settings.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a historical excursus and
discusses the research papers which, to our knowledge, are most closely related to the
present study. The experimental design and procedures are discussed in Section III.
Section IV outlines the characteristics of the sample. Section V describes the econo-
metric model of the choice data, presents and discusses its results and implications.
Section VI concludes.
II LITERATURE REVIEW
Many crucial economic and financial decisions must be made under tight time limi-
tations. Despite its obvious importance the impact of time pressure on decision has
received little attention in literature. There are a few studies that investigate how time
pressure affects risk attitudes. Young et al. (2012) run a laboratory experiment and
ask subjects to state certainty equivalents for gain-only and loss-only gambles. They
show that time pressure increases risk-seeking behavior in the gain domain. Kocher
et al. (2013) consider the effects of time pressure on risk attitude separately for gains,
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losses and mixed gambles by asking subjects to make choices between pure gain, pure
loss and prospects involving both gains and losses, separately. Contrary to Young et al.
(2012), Kocher et al. (2013) find no time pressure effect on risk attitudes for gains, but
an increase in risk aversion for losses.
There are only a few studies that examine strategic interactions under time pres-
sure. Dreu (2003) experimentally investigates the impact of perceived time pressure on
information processing in negotiation. In this experimental study, two groups of sub-
jects were given the same amount of time for the same negotiation task. One group was
told that based on the past research, the given time was more than enough, whereas
the subjects in the other group were told that it was quite tight in order to reach an
agreement. The results show that perceived time pressure reduces efficiency in nego-
tiation by reducing motivation to process information. Sutter et al. (2003) consider
bargaining behavior in an ultimatum game under time pressure and show that time
pressure has a high degree of efficiency costs since it leads to significantly high rejection
rates of offers. Kocher and Sutter (2006) show that in an experimental beauty-contest
game, the rate of convergence to equilibrium and payoffs are lower under high time
pressure than under low time pressure.
Cella et al. (2007) experimentally investigate the affects of time pressure on a
learning based task, Iowa Gambling Task. They show that subjects with real time
constraints perform worse relative to those without such constraint. In order to see
the impact of perceived time pressure on Iowa Gambling Task performance, DeDonno
et al. (2008) follow the procedure used by Dreu (2003), in which a group of subjects
were informed that the given time was insufficient to learn and successfully complete
the given task while the rest were told that it was sufficient. It is shown that the former
group performed significantly worse than the latter group.
The second strand of literature to which this paper contributes is the one on Queue-
ing Theory. The birth of Queuing Theory dates back to 1909, when Agner Krarup
Erlang (1878–1929) published his pioneering work on telephone traffic. Since then, his
contributions have been widely applied in many different fields. In economics, the first
main contribution is due to Naor (1969) and, after this seminal paper, the number
of studies in this area has sensibly grown (see Hassin and Haviv (2003) for an excel-
lent survey). In theoretical studies, it is mostly assumed that the arrival and service
time distributions are commonly known and well understood. Furthermore, customers
are assumed to be fully rational, that is, a customer facing a queue can always accu-
rately and perfectly analyze the given situation and take the optimal action. These
restrictions narrow down the real life situations covered by the models.
The experimental studies on Queueing Theory are limited in number. They can be
divided into three groups: i) experiments in which the assumption of exogenous arrival
times is relaxed; ii) experiments in which the quality of the service is not perfectly
known; iii) experiments which question the psychological impact of waiting in a queue.
The first group includes the contributions by Amnon Rapoport, William Stein,
Darryl A. Seale and their colleagues. This group of authors focuses mainly on transient
cases by considering queues with non-stationary elements. In particular, they relax the
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typical assumption of exogenous arrival times and consider systems where arrivals are
endogenously determined. This is achieved by letting subjects decide on their arrival
times in case they decide to join a (unobservable) queue. Rapoport et al. (2004)
study the case in which the serving facility is accessible during a given time period and
customers can neither queue before the opening time nor get the service after the closing
time. Rapoport et al. (2004) find a strong support for mixed-strategy equilibrium
play only at the aggregate but not at the individual level. Seale et al. (2005) extend
this study by allowing subjects to arrive before the opening time of the facility. The
findings are in complete agreement with those of Rapoport et al. (2004), however the
support for mixed-strategy equilibrium play on the aggregate level disappears when
congestion is unavoidable and information on the previous round’s aggregate behavior
is not available. In a follow-up study, Bearden et al. (2005) construct and test a
reinforcement learning model based on the experimental results reported in Rapoport
et al. (2004) and Seale et al. (2005). While the model accounts well for the aggregate
behavior and generates heterogeneous patterns for the individual decisions similar to
those observed in the data, it predicts considerable more switches (changes in the
strategy between two consequent rounds) than observed.
Batch queues, where a number of agents in the queue are served at the same time,
have also been studied experimentally. Some examples of this type of queue are ferry
and bus services, university shuttles, amusement park rides, etc. Stein et al. (2007)
conduct a batch queue experiment with endogenously determined arrival times under
4 different conditions: (balking allowed/not allowed)×(private/public information).
In the private information condition, subjects are informed about their own perfor-
mance at the end of each round, whereas in the public information condition on top
of their own performance they are also informed about the decisions taken by others
(in the form of a cumulative distribution of arrival times). Stein et al. (2007) report
that, under each condition, the aggregate but not the individual behavior converges to
mixed-strategy equilibrium play. However, such a convergence is faster when balking is
not allowed and the information is public. In a follow-up study, Rapoport et al. (2010)
extend this experimental study by conducting it in “real time”, that is, by making sub-
jects wait for real depending on their decisions, and experience time pressure. Another
departure point of this study from Stein et al. (2007) is that the server capacity (the
number of people served in a batch) is not always fixed but variable in some treat-
ments. Rapoport et al. (2010) find a strong support for equilibrium play only at the
aggregate level, when the server capacity is fixed. When it is variable, the aggregate
behavior diverges and results in a pareto superior outcome. Another study that pro-
vides evidence of convergence to the mixed-strategy equilibrium at an aggregate level
when arrival times are endogenous is Daniel et al. (2009).
The second branch of experimental studies on Queueing Theory considers situations
in which the quality of the service is not perfectly known and investigates weather the
length of the queue could be perceived as a signal of quality. Giebelhausen et al. (2011)
find strong evidence that wait is a positive predictor of quality perception, satisfaction
and purchase intentions when quality is uncertain. Koo and Fishbach (2010) arrive to
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a similar conclusion: one’s perception of quality increases with the number of others
behind him/her in the queue. Kremer and Debo (2013) study herding behavior in an
asymmetric information structure by introducing informed agents. They find support
for the hypothesis that long queues are excessively associated with high quality and
therefore, purchasing frequency may increase in waiting time.
The third group of experiments associated to the Queueing Theory literature studies
the psychological impact of waiting in queues. Leclerc et al. (1995) examine whether
agents, in making decision, treat time as they treat money. The results suggest that
the way time is treated depends on the context, integration of time losses is preferred
over segmentation and agents are risk-averse in the domain of losses. Based on this
last result, Kumar and Krishnamurthy (2008) argue that on the one hand it is in the
service providers’ interest to reduce the uncertainty about service times since agents
are risk averse. However, on the other hand, such a reduction in uncertainty increases
congestion, which, in turn, results in a decreased demand due to congestion aversion.
Kumar and Krishnamurthy (2008) report that congestion aversion is more dominant
than risk aversion. That is, when possible, people tend to avoid congestion, when this is
not possible (or if no congestion is anticipated) they avoid to take risk in waiting times.
Another psychological impact of waiting is studied by Oxoby and Bischak (2005), who
investigate the effect of the manner in which a waiting situation occurs on the inference
of time costs. Their results suggest that, after being exposed to unoccupied waiting
time, there is a decrease in inequality aversion and an increase in negative reciprocity.
Our paper differs from the above mentioned studies on time pressure in that we do
not consider risk attitudes, learning or strategic decisions. In order to investigate the
pure impact of time pressure, we go to the basics and analyze a non-strategic decision.
The experimental task we use is a binary choice decision where one of the alternatives
is objectively better. However, cognitive abilities are required to be used in order
to correctly evaluate alternatives. We question the effects of time pressure on such
a primitive decision process that includes no strategic interaction. Furthermore, this
study differs from the above mentioned queueing theory literature in that it analyzes
the behavior of a customer who finds herself in a basic queueing environment and
focuses on the aspects she considers when making a queueing decision. In our setting,
the quality of the service is perfectly known and therefore, the length of a queue does
not serve as a signaling device. Lu et al. (2013) is strongly related to our paper. Their
empirical study analyzes customers’ purchasing behavior in a queueing environment
through a field experiment conducted at a deli counter of a grocery store. One of the
key findings of this study is that queueing decisions are made mainly based on the
length of a queue rather than its speed. This particular result chimes nicely with our
experimental finding that there exists a type of customer who considers the length and
ignores all the other characteristics of a queue.
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III EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
In our experimental design, subjects were presented with two servers, that were pro-
viding the same service. One of the servers was always faster than the other but this
premium service was not free of charge, whereas the slower server did not require any
entry fee. Subjects were informed about the speed2 as well as the length3 of each queue,
and asked to choose between joining the faster queue by paying its fee and joining the
slower one for free. We use the notation NEF for a queue without an entry fee and EF
for a queue with an entry fee.
The experiment included 40 different tasks, each of which is formed by a different
combination of queueing parameters. There were in total five such parameters: the
speed and the length of each queue, and the entry fee for the faster queue EF. Each
task was repeated three times under different treatment conditions of time allowance:
5 seconds (5 sec), 10 seconds (10 sec) and no time limitation (NTL). That is, each sub-
ject was asked to make 120 decisions in total. The order the subjects were presented
these tasks was randomized. The time restriction for each task was displayed both by
a visual and a digital count-down timer. Fig. 1 displays a snapshot from the experiment.
Figure 1
A Snapshot from the Experiment
The score of a subject in a round was calculated by subtracting the entry fee and
total waiting cost related to the queue to which s/he decided to join from the initial
endowment. Each round’s initial endowment was 100 ECUs (Experimental Currency
2The information on the speed of a server was given in terms of the average waiting time per
person.
3The information on the length of a queue was not only given numerically but also visually using
figures. See the snapshot in Figure1.
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Units) and the waiting cost per minute was 3 ECUs. Thus, the score of a round was
(100− entry fee− 3 ∗ wait). Experimental Currency Units were converted into euros
at the rate of e0.30 and subjects were paid according to their score in a randomly
chosen round.
III.I Procedures
The experiment was programmed in C++ using a Z-tree interface (Fischbacher, 2007)
and conducted in the experimental laboratory of the Max Planck Institute of Economics
in Jena (Germany), directed by Prof. Werner Gu¨th.
Participants were undergraduate students from the University of Jena, recruited
by the ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) software. Upon entering the laboratory, participants
were randomly assigned to visually isolated computer terminals. The instructions were
distributed and then read aloud to establish public knowledge.
Overall, we collected 11, 640 observations from 97 subjects across five sessions and
on average each session lasted about 75 minutes including the time being used up for
reading the instructions and paying the participants. Average earnings per subject
were e17 (inclusive of a e2.50 show-up fee).
IV DESCRIPTIVE DATA ANALYSIS
This section presents our findings obtained from basic analysis of our data. We ini-
tially consider the success rate across treatments. As seen from Table 1, of all the
decisions made in the treatment without any time limitation (NTL) only 73% is op-
timal. This rate decreases to 68% when 10 seconds of time limitation is introduced
and continues to do so as the limitation becomes more stringent. Hence, looking at
the aggregate data immediately shows that time pressure impairs decision performance.
Table 1
Success Rates across Treatments
5 sec 10 sec NTL
success
65% 68% 73 %
rate
In order to gain more insight into the subjects’ behavior, we deepen our analysis by
examining the success rate when it is optimal to join each queue separately. The first
row of Table 2 presents the success rates for the tasks in which the profit of joining
the slower with no entry fee queue (pi(NEF)) is higher than the profit of joining the
faster with an entry fee queue (pi(EF)). The second row gives the complementary
rates concerning the tasks where it is optimal to join the faster queue. The success
rate increases as the time limitation is relaxed even when we consider tasks separately
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depending on the identity of the optimal queue. However, a comparison between the
rows of Table 2 shows that in each treatment, the success rate is higher when the
optimal decision is to join the queue with no entry fee. This observation suggests that
there may be a tendency towards the no entry fee queue.
Table 2
Success Rates across Treatments
5 sec 10 sec NTL
pi(NEF) >pi(EF) 70% 72% 77%
pi(NEF)<pi(EF) 58% 62% 68%
To attain a finer grain of analysis, we further examine success rates by introducing
an additional criteria on top of the identity of optimal queue. The new criteria is the
identity of the shorter queue. Now we have four categories4 of tasks and the success
rate for each category is presented in Table 3. Due to their similarity, we present the
rates not for each treatment separately but in aggregate terms.
The best performed task category is the one given in the first cell of Table 3, where
Table 3
Success Rates across Task Types
|EF |> |NEF | |NEF |> |EF |
pi(NEF)>pi(EF) 79% 61%
pi(NEF)<pi(EF) 53% 70%
the optimal decision is to join the no entry fee (NEF) queue, which is also shorter. The
second best performed task type lies in the second cell on diagonal. This time, the
faster queue with entry fee (EF) is more profitable and shorter. When we consider the
off-diagonal cells the success rate drops considerably. What one might conclude from
this observation is that there is a tendency towards shorter queue.
In the following section, we introduce the mixture model that we use to test the
hypothesis that agents use the information they could extract efficiently and make
the optimal queueing decision. The mixture model confirms our conjectures that time
pressure harms decision performance, and that there are tendencies towards no entry
fee and shorter queue.
V THE MIXTURE MODEL
Let us assume that there are G different types of decision maker in the population,
denoted by the subscript g. Let i indicate the subject and τ ∈ {5 sec, 10 sec,NTL}
4We exclude the cases where both queues have the same length or are equally profitable.
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denote the experimental treatment. In each round, subject i is faced with the choice
between two queues whose servers provide the same service: a queue with no entry fee
(NEF) and a queue with entry fee (EF).
Subject i’s decision is based on the following equation:
dτ∗igt = γ
τ
g +X
′
itβ
τ
g + δ
τ
ig + ε
τ
igt t
τ
i = 1, . . . , T
τ
i
δτig ∼ N
(
0, στ2g
)
(1)
ετig ∼ N (0, 1)
Here, dτ∗it is the latent dependent variable representing subject i’s propensity to choose
queue NEF in treatment τ ; γτg is a type-specific intercept; Xit is a vector of explanatory
variable describing the characteristics of the two queues and βτg is a vector of coefficients
on such variables; δτig is a subject-specific time-invariant intercept, which follows a
Normal distribution with mean 0 and variance στ2g ; finally, ε
τ
ig is a Standard Normal
distributed idiosyncratic error term.
We do not observe dτ∗igt directly, but a {−1, 1} indicator, which is linked to dτ∗igt by
the following observational rule:
dτigt =
{
1 if dτ∗igt ≥ 0,
−1 else.
This is the well-known random-effects probit model, whose assumptions lead to subject
i’s likelihood contribution, given that he/she is of type g ∈ 1, . . . , G, being
lτig =
∫ ∞
−∞
40∏
t=1
Φ
[
dτigt ×
(
γτg +X
′
itβ
τ
g + δ
τ
ig
)]
ϕ
(
δτg ; 0, σ
τ2
g
)
dδτg . (2)
Here, Φ[.] is the Standard Normal Cumulative Distribution Function and ϕ
(
δτg ; 0, σ
τ2
g
)
is the Normal density function with mean 0 and variance στ2g , evaluated at δ
τ
g .
Types differ in the decision rules adopted, that is, in the variables that they con-
sult when choosing their preferred queue. We want to isolate groups of subjects who
adopt similar decision rules when choosing between the NEF and the EF queue. For
this purpose, we adopt a finite mixture model approach and assume that there are
two types of subjects (G = 2): (i)“profit maximizer” who uses all the relevant infor-
mation and decides rationally, as suggested by the theory; (ii) “na¨ıve” who uses the
provided information in a less-than-efficient way. We assume that each subject is either
profit maximizer or na¨ıve, and cannot change type within a treatment. As data from
each treatment is analyzed separately, the mixture model hypothesis made here does
allow subjects to change type (decision rules) but only across treatments. Verifying
whether subjects change type and understanding the evolution of decision rules across
treatments are indeed among the main scopes of our analysis.
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The likelihood contribution of subject i in treatment τ is then
Lτi =
∑
g
pig × lτig. (3)
Here, pig, termed “mixing proportion”, represents the fraction of the total population
who are type g ∈ {profit-maximizer, na¨ıve}, so that∑g pig = 1. The mixing proportions
are estimated along with the other parameters of the model by maximizing the full
sample log-likelihood,
LogLτ =
n∑
i=1
ln[Lτi ]. (4)
The mixture model is estimated using the method of Maximum Simulated Likelihood
for each treatment τ ∈ {5 sec, 10 sec,NTL} separately. In each component g of the mix-
ture, integration over δτg is performed by simulation using 100 draws for each contestant
based on Halton sequences (Train, 2009).
V.I Estimation Results
The results from the maximization of Eq. (4) are reported in Table 4. For each treat-
ment, there are two columns displaying the parameter estimates of the mixture models
for each type. The type “profit maximizer” is characterized by using the difference in
profits of the two queues (∆(profit)=pi(NEF) − pi(EF)) as explanatory variable. On
the other hand, sub-optimal behavior of a “na¨ıve” decision maker is modeled by means
of the average waiting times and the lengths of the two queues, and we also control for
the entry fee level of the EF queue.
The results show that the coefficient of the variable of interest for the profit max-
imizer type, i.e. ∆(profit), is of the expected sign and statistically significant in each
treatment5. It amounts to say that this type uses the difference in profits as the de-
cision criteria and joins the queue that provides higher profit. The na¨ıve type, on the
other hand, seems to ignore the information on average waiting times and considers
the length of the two queues and the entry fee as the decision criteria. In 5 sec treat-
ment, however, there is a small exception that in addition to the previously named
variables, the average waiting time of NEF queue is also significant, but only slightly
so. Furthermore, all the significant variables are of the expected sign.
The mixing proportions pig indicate that with time constraints the fraction of profit
maximizers decreases and thus decision performance impairs. When no time limitation
is imposed 65% of subjects is profit maximizer. This ratio declines to 50% under the
loose time constraint of 10 seconds. Finally, there are mildly more na¨ıve types than
profit maximizers in 5 sec treatment.
The mixture model assigns subjects to a type probabilistically and therefore, it
does not specify which subject is assigned to which type. Furthermore, the model
5***, ** and * denote p-values < 0.01, < 0.05 and < 0.10, respectively.
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Table 4
Maximum likelihood estimates of the mixture model’s parameters
τ 5 sec 10 sec NTL
g prof.max. na¨ıve prof.max. na¨ıve prof.max. na¨ıve
regressors
∆(profit) 0.0316*** 0.0432*** 0.0517***
(0.0032) (0.0033) (0.0031)
average waiting time (NEF) -0.0097* -0.0082 -0.0014
(0.0052) (0.0054) (0.0069)
average waiting time (EF) -0.0022 0.0077 0.0095
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0064)
length (NEF) -0.0368*** -0.0278*** -0.0259***
(0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0062)
length (EF) 0.0360*** 0.0344*** 0.0481***
(0.0034 ) (0.0036) (0.0048 )
entry fee EF server 0.0178*** 0.0164*** 0.0220***
(0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0043)
γg 0.1651*** 0.1418 0.0987* -0.2924 0.1384*** -1.3057**
(0.0467) (0.4134) (0.0559) (0.4260) (0.0424) (0.5207)
στg 0.1448*** 0.3655*** 0.2020*** 0.3550*** 0.2185*** 0.3012***
(0.0574) (0.0520) (0.0669) (0.0513) (0.0428) (0.0582)
pig 0.4322*** 0.5678*** 0.5036*** 0.4964*** 0.6478*** 0.3522***
(0.0802) (0.0802) (0.0764) (0.0764) (0.0667) (0.0667)
LogLikelihood -2371.93 -2335.28 -2182.46
number of observations 3860 3873 3880
number of subjects 97 97 97
is run separately for each treatment. This means that the model does not help us
in determining whether a subject assigned to a specific type in one treatment is also
assigned to the same type in other treatments. The next subsection investigates this
issue and examines how types evolve across treatments.
V.II The Evolution of Decision Rules
We start investigating the evolution of types by calculating the posterior probability
of being a specific type for each subject in each treatment τ ∈ {5 sec, 10 sec,NTL}.
We derive these probabilities using the Bayes’ rule and the estimation results from
our mixture model (see Table 4). Subject i’s posterior probability of being type g ∈
{profit maximizer, na¨ıve} is the given by
ppτi,g(obs
τ
i ) = Pr [i = type g | obsτi ] =
Pr [i = type g]× Pr [obsτi | i = type g]
Pr [obsτi ]
(5)
=
piτg × lτig
Lτi
, (6)
where obsτi represents the observations collected from subject i in treatment τ . In
practice, piτg , l
τ
ig and L
τ
i are replaced by their estimated counterparts, obtained by
maximizing Eq. (4) from treatment τ data, for all g. Obviously, subject i’s posterior
14
probability of being na¨ıve type is obtained by ppτi,na¨ıve = 1− ppτi,prof.max., for all τ .
Figure 2
Histograms of Posterior Probabilities of Being Profit Maximizer Type
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The histograms of the posterior probabilities of being profit maximizer type are dis-
played in Fig. 2. The resulting posterior probabilities are consistent with the mixing
proportions estimated by the mixture model. In 5 sec treatment, na¨ıve type is mildly
preponderant. When the time allowance is 10 seconds, the posterior probabilities of
being one of the two types are almost equal. With no time limitation, na¨ıve type is
decidedly recessive. Most of the subjects are concentrated at the extremes of the dis-
tributions. This finding testifies that our mixtures are rather powerful at segregating
subjects, except for a small number of them for whom there is some uncertainty. We
assign subjects to types according to the maximum posterior probability. Figure 3
shows the cumulative percentage of subjects assigned to a type with maximum pos-
terior probability less than the probability indicated on the horizontal axis, for each
treatment. The figure confirms that the power of our mixture model at segregating
subjects is quite impressive: 60%, 70% and 85% of them are assigned to type with
posterior probability larger than 0.90 in treatment 5 sec, 10 sec and NTL, respectively.
Overall, the assignment to a type is remarkably good in the treatment with no time
limitation, only marginally less in the other two cases.
Having assigned each subject to a type in each treatment, now we are ready to
consider subjects’ profiles throughout the experiment. We have eight profiles since there
are two possible types for each treatment. Table 5 reports frequencies and proportions
for all these eight profiles.
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Figure 3
Cumulative proportion of subjects assigned to a type with maximum posterior
probability < posterior probability indicated on the horizontal axis, by treatment.
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The most popular profile is the one where subjects are assigned to na¨ıve type
in 5 sec and 10 sec treatments, but to profit maximizer type in NTL treatment (the
second row of the table). When there were time limitations, thirty percent of our
sample failed to make the optimal decision but managed to do so when no limitation
was imposed. A possible explanation for this behavior could be that the given time
allowances were not long enough to think throughly and choose the more profitable
queue, but when limitations were removed subjects could take the time necessary and
make the optimal decision. Another possibility is that it was not the tightness of time
allowances (especially for 10 sec treatment) that caused these subjects to perform badly
in 5 sec and 10 sec treatments, but the presence of a limitation. Under time pressure,
they might have panicked and used their time inefficiently, and therefore failed to make
the optimal decision. We postpone investigating this issue to the next subsection where
we consider the decision times.
Table 5 reveals that the second most popular profile, that is adopt by 29% of our
subject pool, is being profit maximizer type in each treatment. These subjects showed
consistent behavior throughout the experiment and different time limitations did not
affect their making rational decisions. The other profile that is consistent throughout
the experiment is the one which is assigned as na¨ıve type in each treatment and is
adopted by 11% of our population. In total 40% of the subjects behaved consistently
and did not change type. This amounts to say that time pressure did not have any
effect on these subjects.
When we ignore the tightest time limitation, 5 sec, treatment we can define three
categories of profile pattern depending on subjects’ assigned types in treatments 10 sec
and NTL. We do this in order to study the effects of the presence of a time limitation.
The first profile category is consistent pattern where subjects are assigned to either
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Table 5
Profile Frequencies and Proportions
τ
5 sec 10 sec NTL Frequency Proportion
na¨ıve na¨ıve na¨ıve 11 11%
na¨ıve na¨ıve prof.max. 29 30%
na¨ıve prof.max. na¨ıve 1 1%
na¨ıve prof.max. prof.max. 17 18%
prof.max. na¨ıve na¨ıve 3 3%
prof.max. na¨ıve prof.max. 7 7%
prof.max. prof.max. na¨ıve 1 1%
prof.max. prof.max. prof.max. 28 29%
profit maximizer or na¨ıve type in both treatments. Time pressure does not have any
impact for those who follow this pattern, and they constitute 61% of our population.
The second category is improving pattern where subjects change their type from na¨ıve
to profit maximizer when time limitation is removed. 37% of our subjects are in this
category. It is striking that when time pressure is cut out more than one-third of the
population’s decision performance is improved. As mentioned earlier, we will discuss
whether this improvement is due to the fact that 10 seconds were not enough to make
the optimal decision in the following subsection. The last category is worsening pattern
where subjects switch from profit maximizer to na¨ıve type when passing from 10 sec
to NTL treatment. This type of unexpected behavior is quite rare in our population;
in fact, it is adopted only by 2%.
Finally, we would like to note that if instead of 10 sec treatment we compare 5 sec
with NTL treatment, the fractions of the population who shows consistent, improving
and worsening pattern are 48%, 48% and 4%, respectively. This time we see that while
almost half of the subjects does not change their types between the two treatments, a
great deal of them improve their decision performance. Furthermore, the unexpected
behavior is again rarely observed.
V.III Decision Times
In this subsection, we analyze the decision time of the subjects in our sample under
the three treatments. The descriptive statistics, given in Table 6, reveals that decision
times are different across treatment.6 Paired t-tests confirm that the differences are
6In treatment 5 sec and 10 sec, 20 and 7 decision times are missing, respectively, because subjects
did not make a decision within the given time limit. In these few cases, for the tables and the tests
reported in this section, we have replaced the missing decision times with the upper time limit. Even
if we neglect these missing observations, the reported tests’ results do not alter.
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statistically significant.7 Furthermore, we see that subjects use more time to make a
decision as time limitations are relaxed. This implies that a possible explanation why
decision performance is improved across treatments could be that subjects take more
time to analyze the parameters of the environment and hence make a better decision.
Table 6
Summary Statistics of Decision Times.
τ 5 sec 10 sec NTL
Mean 2.413 3.338 8.180
Std. Dev. 0.773 1.429 4.952
Min 0.595 0.670 1.392
Max 3.901 6.244 22.564
Number of subjects 97 97 97
An interesting observation revealed by Table 6 is that the average decision time in
NTL treatment, under which subjects performed best, is around 8.2 seconds. However,
the average decision time drops to 3.3 seconds in 10 sec treatment. This implies that
the presence of time limitation puts a great deal of subjects under pressure and hin-
ders them from using the given time efficiently, and this, in turn, harms the decision
performance.
We deepen our analysis by examining decision times by types. The descriptive
statistics, given in Table 7, verify our previous observation that subjects take more
time to decide when the limitations are relaxed holds regardless of types. Furthermore,
profit maximizers spend more time than na¨ıve types no matter what the time limitation
is. In fact, a two-sample t-test with unequal variances confirms that regardless of the
treatment we can reject the hypothesis that both types spend the same amount of
time, on average, to make a decision. The test statistics and p-values are reported in
the third and fourth rows of the table.
In the previous subsection we have seen that one-third of the population exhibits an
improving profile pattern and change from na¨ıve to profit maximizer type when 10 sec
and NTL treatments are compared. These subjects spend, on average, 2.7 seconds
in 10 sec treatment and 8.9 seconds in NTL treatment. This observation shows that
even though the subjects had enough time to make better decisions in 10 sec, they
failed to use it efficiently. Decision performance of these subjects is impaired not due
to the tightness of time constraint but due to the existence of such a limitation. As
a sanitary check, we have isolated profit-maximizer types of NTL treatment who are
using less than 10 seconds and scrutinized their behavior in 10 sec treatment. This
investigation confirms our finding that it is the presence of time constraint that harms
the performance.
7The t-statistic takes values −11.604, −12.621 and −11.597, for comparisons 5 sec vs. 10 sec, 5 sec
vs. NTL and 10 sec vs. NTL, respectively. These tests’ p-values under the null hypothesis that the
means from the two treatments are equal against the alternative that they are not are always < 0.001.
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Table 7
Summary Statistics of Decision Times by Types
τ 5 sec 10 sec NTL
g prof.max. na¨ıve prof.max. na¨ıve prof.max. na¨ıve
Mean 2.746 2.189 4.036 2.683 8.864 4.716
Std. Dev. 0.661 0.767 1.396 1.125 5.050 2.365
t-statistic -3.817 -5.235 -5.089
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of subjects 39 58 47 50 81 16
A final remark from Table 7 is that decision time cannot be the only explanation for
na¨ıve behavior. Subjects classified as na¨ıve type in NTL treatment use more time than
profit maximizer type of 10 sec treatment, but perform relatively worse. They spend
some time to analyze the parameters of the queueing system, but this does not improve
their decisions either because their cognitive capacity fall short or they intentionally
follow a rule of thumb.
VI DISCUSSION
The main contribution of this study is twofold. First, it adds to the understanding
of the impact of time pressure on non-strategic decision. Second, it contributes to
the characterization of customer queueing behavior by experimentally examining the
situation in which subjects need to make decision between two queues under different
treatment conditions of time allowance. Our econometric analysis suggests that when
there is no time pressure, a considerable proportion of the population behaves rationally
and base their decisions mainly on the profits they would gain joining each queue. Time
pressure increasingly harms decision performance and causes the size of this proportion
to decrease. The rest of the population does not use the provided information in a
normative way. They pay no attention to server speed, which is given as the average
waiting time per person in the queue. They seem to use rule of thumbs that exhibit a
tendency towards the shorter queue.
At a finer grain of analysis, we find that the reason why time pressure harms decision
performance of most subjects is not the insufficiency of time constraint but the existence
of such a limitation. Time pressure stresses many people and urges them to use rule
of thumbs instead of analyzing the situation properly, which may lead to suboptimal
decisions. That is to say, no trifling portion of subjects systematically follows the
shorter queue when there is time pressure, but acts almost rationally when the pressure
vanishes. Moreover, our results suggest that individuals are diversely affected by time
pressure. Besides subjects whose performance is impaired by time pressure, there are
also others that exhibit consistent behavior throughout the experiment. The existence
or the level of time pressure does not seem to have any impact on their types.
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Finally, our analysis reveals that the average time subjects take to make decision
increases as we relax time limitation. An investigation of decision times shows that
profit maximizers take significantly more time than their na¨ıve peers under any time
limitation condition. The importance of this result is twofold. First, it testifies that
the decision criterion used by profit maximizers is cognitively more demanding than
the decision process of na¨ıve subjects. Second, it indirectly emphasizes our mixture
model’s success in segregating subjects into types and justifies our reasons for choosing
this analytical approach.
Although the queueing environment studied in this paper is very simplistic, the
findings potentially pave the way for further research by providing useful inputs. One
possibility is to deepen the investigation of non standard behavior. In this study, we
classified any behavior that is not rational as na¨ıve. However, using a large enough
number of subjects, the non-rational behavior could be further categorized by isolating
different decision rules used by subjects. The characterization of different types would
bring about the consideration of a mechanism design that screens and discriminates
customers based on their types, and the welfare effect of this discrimination.
There are some limitations to this experiment. We provided subjects with explicit
information on the server speed in order to see how they react to it. In a real life
situation, this piece of information is not explicitly available but could be extracted
by observing the queue for a while. However the fact that subjects pay no attention
to this explicitly given information suggests that they would not even try to extract it
when facing a similar situation in everyday life.
A more serious limitation to our experiment is that the subjects did not experience
the irritation and annoyance of waiting in a queue. A round finished and a new one
began immediately after a subject made his/her decision to which queue to join, with-
out waiting for real. Designing an experiment that involves real waiting is problematic
because the cost of waiting is subjective and not observable. That is, each subject’s
annoyance due to waiting may be different, and moreover, measuring or deducing it
may not even be possible. Finally, due to the accumulation effect of this cost, a robust
analysis would require a huge number subjects since no more than a few observations
could be obtained from a single subject.
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